Crisis in Kosovo is topic of April 7 panel discussion

Professor Peter Katzenstein comments during the April 7 panel in Hollis E. Cornell Auditorium on the crisis in Kosovo, while professors Henry Shue and Valerie Bunce look on. Frank DiMeo/University Photography

By Christopher Greaves '01

A panel was convened April 7 in the Hollis E. Cornell Auditorium of Goldwin Smith Hall for a discussion about the crisis in Kosovo. Organized by the Cornell University Political Forum, the panel included Valerie Bunce, professor of government; Peter Katzenstein, the W.S. Carpenter Professor of International Studies; Henry Shue, the W. Hutchinson Professor in Ethics and Public Life; and John Weiss, associate professor of history.

Each panelist gave a five-minute talk about the conflict between the Serbian armed forces and Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. After the discussion, the panelists responded to questions from the audience.

Bunce provided the historical background for the conflict in Kosovo, saying the tension between the Serbs and the Albanians apparently began after Yugoslavia's constitution was rewritten in 1974, under the leadership of Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia's former president. The new constitution increased the power of the Albanian majority in Kosovo and alienated the Serbian minority as a result.

With the death of Tito in 1980 and the destabilization of southeastern Europe in the 1990s, Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslavia's current leader, was able to seize control of the region by exploiting Serbian resentment of the Albanian majority. He became what Weiss called an "entrepreneur of ethnicity," using the ethnic difference between Serbs and Albanians to gain political support from Kosovo's Serbs. He revoked the autonomy of Kosovo's Albanians and began "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia and, most recently, in Kosovo. The "cleansing" or murder and removal of Albanians by the Serbian armed forces has elicited military intervention from NATO, whose forces began bombing the region March 24.

Weiss and Shue both questioned the effectiveness of NATO's air strikes. They advocated deploying ground troops to the region. Shue pointed out that while bombing "might do irreparable damage to the Serbian military, it appears quite likely that long before that happens the Kosovars will have been driven out of their own country." He added that if troops had been sent to the region in Spring '98 "before the Serbs had moved in all their tanks and special police," NATO could have protected them. Shue feels that if the U.S. and other NATO forces do send ground troops, it should be with the goal of punishing ethnic cleansing, because it's too late to save those who have been victimized.

During the question-and-answer session, one audience member asked the panel what Milosevic is hoping to accomplish through ethnic cleansing. Bunce responded by saying that Milosevic is a short-sighted man who is mainly interested in maximizing "his power at the moment" and that "this ultimately means that he will lose Kosovo and may very well lose Montenegro (Yugoslavia's other province), too."

Another audience member asked what the consequences will be for the region if the NATO intervention is successful. Bunce again responded, saying that Serbia will most likely "disintegrate after Milosevic" and that the "best-case scenario" would be an effort to stabilize Yugoslavia after the conflict.