Senator Harkin, Senator Lugar, and members of the Committee, I am Alfonso Torres, Associate Dean for Veterinary Public Policy and Director of the New York State Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratory at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Cornell University. I want to thank you for the invitation to testify on the President's proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I do so on behalf of myself only, and my comments do not necessarily represent the positions of either the State of New York or of Cornell University in matters related to this hearing. However, I believe that my comments reflect a great majority of veterinarians associated with State Animal Health Diagnostic Laboratories around the country and many other individuals involved in safeguarding our vital animal industries. My comments are based on my extensive personal and professional experience of eleven years of work for the USDA, eight of those years at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center where I held the position of Chief of the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory under APHIS, and later the position of Director of the entire Center under ARS. I also had the honor of serving as the APHIS Deputy Administrator for Veterinary Services and Chief Veterinary Officer for the United States for three years until my departure from USDA only 5 months ago.
In general I support the President's proposal for the creation of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to increase our border security and be better prepared and coordinated in dealing with potential bioterrorist and agroterrorists attacks. The President's proposal calls for the transfer of all USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) activities under the Border and Transportation Security Division, and the transfer of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) under the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Division.
The President's proposal to include all APHIS in the new DHS reflects the recognition and general understanding of the importance of APHIS activities in safeguarding animal and plant health for more than 150 years. APHIS' contributions to the well-being of society have been well demonstrated in its success in keeping serious animal diseases and plant pests from entering our country. However, it is important to keep in mind that APHIS has many functions that are not totally related to the exclusion of animal diseases and plant pests from entering our country. Three out of five APHIS main programs do not have functions that are directly associated to the proposed mission of the new Department of Homeland Security: International Services, Wildlife Services, and Animal Care. The other two: Veterinary Services and Plant Protection and Quarantine have some activities compatible with the new Department. These activities are related to the actual inspections at ports of entry and the issuing import permits for agricultural commodities and for restricted animal or plant pathogens. There are some activities of Veterinary Services related to response to natural disasters or disease emergencies when animals are involved, that would fit within the activities assigned to the Division of Emergency Preparedness and Response of the proposed Department. Finally, there are activities at the scientific centers and laboratories of APHIS and ARS that will need to be coordinated with the proposed activities assigned to the Division of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures.
Based on my experiences at USDA and my knowledge of APHIS and ARS missions and activities, I respectfully suggest that you consider the following suggestions when considering the President's proposal for the transfer of all APHIS and of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to the new Department of Homeland Security.
1. APHIS, PPQ Port Activities: All agricultural port inspection could be transferred to the Border and Transportation Security Division of the DHS. Their duties are quite integrated to the Customs Service of DOJ and they are already co-located at sea, land and air ports of entry. In compensation for the loss of PPQ personnel currently located at ports of entry that would be available for combating plant disease outbreaks, APHIS should receive funding (or retain funding not transferred to DHS) for hiring of plant health professionals to be distributed in all 50 states to conduct the necessary surveillance and diagnostic activities for plant health in the United States.2. APHIS, VS and PPQ Import Export Permitting Activities: Activities related to the issuing of import permits for plant and animal agricultural commodities could be integrated to the Customs Service, as part of their import permitting activities.
3. APHIS, VS Emergency Management Liaison with FEMA: As identified by APHIS in previous budget requests, there is a need to have emergency management veterinarians co-located with FEMA to coordinate their assistance in disasters of any origin where animals are involved. These nine or ten positions (one or two veterinarians at headquarters plus one veterinarian for each of the eight FEMA regional offices) could be created as part of enhanced activities of FEMA under the new DHS.
4. APHIS, Animal and Plant Health Laboratories & Science Centers: All APHIS, Veterinary Services laboratories and science centers involved in animal health (including the Centers for Veterinary Biologics and the National Veterinary Services Laboratories at Ames, IA and at Plum Island, NY, the Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health at Fort Collins, CO, and the Center for Veterinary Biologics at Ames, IA) should be kept under the current administrative arrangements within USDA. The same recommendation applies to APHIS, PPQ plant health laboratories in several locations in the United States as well as their Center for Plant Health Science and Technology at Raleigh, NC.
5. APHIS and ARS Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC): The President's proposal would move the PIADC from USDA into the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures Division of the DHS. It is important to point out that the PIADC was created at Plum Island, NY in 1954 as the only laboratory in the US where foot and mouth disease (FMD) and other highly contagious diseases could be studied. Because of the legal requirements of restricting work on FMD to an island setting, APHIS' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) has co-located its Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) at the PIADC. Thus, the PIADC has two components from two different USDA agencies: ARS and APHIS. The ARS conducts research restricted to an island setting on selected foreign animal diseases. APHIS conducts diagnostic on highly contagious diseases of livestock at Plum Island, conducts training of veterinarians from the US and abroad, in the recognition and diagnosis of most foreign animal diseases. This is an activity outside the main scope of the proposed DHS. It is important to point out that not all research and diagnosis of foreign animal diseases are studied or diagnosed at the PIADC. In fact, all poultry foreign and domestic animal diseases are diagnosed at the NVSL facilities in Ames, IA, with research in many done at ARS' laboratories in Athens, GA. All equine foreign and domestic animal diseases are diagnosed in NVSL facilities at Ames, IA, in addition all diagnostic work on transmissible encephalopathies including the surveillance for BSE or "Mad Cow Disease" is conducted at Ames, IA. NVSL diagnostic activities are coordinated with CDC laboratories when dealing with zoonotic diseases. Examples are the cooperative work on rabies, west Nile virus and other encephalidities common to humans and horses. While is understandable the desire to better coordinate the different federal activities related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures, it is also important to point out that the federal laboratories dealing with human diseases and organisms that could be used for bioterrorism are not proposed to be transferred to the DHS. These laboratories are; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of DHHS (located at Atlanta, GA and Fort Collins, CO), and at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) also of DHHS at Bethesda, MD. In the case of CDC and NIH laboratories, the President's proposal would keep them under their current Department but would provide additional funding and programs for assisting the new Department of Homeland Security with laboratory support in the areas of diagnosis and research to enhance the capabilities of the US in deterring, preventing and responding to bioterrorist attacks. Exactly the same arguments could be made regarding the USDA's laboratory facilities and programs at Ames, IA and at Plum Island, NY. There is no difference in mission and activities between the NIH/CDC laboratories for human health and the NVSL/CVB and Plum Island Animal Disease Center laboratories of APHIS for animal health. They both provide the scientific basis for surveillance, early detection and responses for either human or animal diseases. In addition, thanks to the leadership of Secretary Veneman, we are in the process of developing a national network of animal and plant diagnostic laboratories that will provide needed redundancy and increased capacity in the US in dealing with large outbreaks of animal or plant diseases regardless of their origin. Thus the integration of the diagnostic laboratories from the State Departments of Agriculture with USDA will more than justify keeping the critical animal and plant federal laboratories under the USDA.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify in front of your committee. I wish you well in these important deliberations that will contribute to the enhancing of our abilities to continue to safeguard animal and plant health in our country.