Experts ponder bioterrorism threats and best defenses


Courtesy of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Rocco Casagrande, a former U.N. bioweapons insepctor, speaking at "Bugs and Bombs: Preparing Intelligently for Bioterrorism," March 22 in Washington, D.C.

A perfect analogy for biodefense is the bulletproof vest: It protects only the torso, but that's the most vulnerable area so it increases the wearer's chance of survival, said Rocco Casagrande '95, Ph.D. '01, a former U.N. bioweapons inspector and now a consultant on biological warfare and defense, speaking at a Cornell-hosted panel discussion in Washington, D.C., March 22.

He was part of the panel "Bugs and Bombs: Preparing Intelligently for Bioterrorism" at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Led by Fredrik Logevall, director of Cornell's Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies, the panelists agreed that education and understanding are critical to avoid errors and prevent disaster. Understanding the best way to communicate with the public during a crisis is just as crucial to defense as assessing risk and making technical preparations, they said.

For example, author and investigative journalist Amanda Ripley '96, who witnessed firsthand the 2001 anthrax attacks while working for Time magazine in New York City, noted that bioterrorism threats are as psychological as much as they are physical.

Politicians often respond with uncertainty, she said. They tell the public not to panic, such as during the H1N1 scare, which leads to more distrust, according to Ripley.

"None of that is reassuring," she said. "It has a negative effect. ... I would argue that [distrust] has killed more people in the U.S. than bioterrorism."

In the end, some of the best prevention would be to better assess risk by knowing what causes dread and fear and to learn how to better communicate with the public, she said.

Casagrande noted that recent spending on biodefense has reduced the likelihood of attacks on humans, livestock and plants and other systems where attacks would be most damaging. In addition, terrorism risk assessments, he said, have added to our intelligence about the bad guys' capabilities -- what is possible versus what is likely.

Additionally, the government has enhanced disaster preparedness by improving hospitals' readiness to care for a surge of victims, creating systems for mass transportation and expanding public education, he said.

Panelist Kathleen Vogel, Cornell associate professor with a joint appointment in the Department of Science and Technology Studies and the Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict, said it is imperative to focus on better analyzing how weapons programs develop and which actors have the capability to succeed. Citing the Soviet bioweapons program, Vogel noted that its hidden plan employed thousands of people at more than 40 facilities but was structurally and technically uneven in its work and weapons.

By examining such cases in depth, we can understand what causes failure and the challenges that actors face in developing biological weapons, she said.

"There are persistent problems in making accurate assessments; problems of overestimating or underestimating these threats," Vogel said. "We can't expect perfect knowledge; there will always be shortcomings, but both the difficulty and stakes of the bioweapons problem highlight the need to identify gaps and new ways to approach data collection and analysis for these assessments in order to mitigate future error."

A successful mass attack would necessitate both motivation and technical skill, Casagrande said. But when these two forces do connect, Casagrande said one thing is certain: "It only takes once."

The event was a collaboration of the Einaudi Center, Cornell Club of Washington, Cornell in Washington and Cornell on the Road; the latter organized the event.

Molly Nevola is a freelance writer in Washington, D.C.

 

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