Vogel calls for new approach to bioweapons analysis

Kathleen Vogel
Vogel

The horrifying terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, and the anthrax strikes that soon followed gave the United States new reason to fear unconventional enemies and atypical weapons. These fears have prompted extensive research, study and planning within the U.S. military, intelligence and policy communities regarding potential attacks involving biological weapons.

A new book, "Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? A New Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats" (The Johns Hopkins University Press), by Kathleen Vogel, associate professor in Cornell's Department of Science and Technology Studies, argues for a major shift in how analysts assess these and other bioweapons threats -- one that highlights how the U.S. analyses have failed in the past.

In the book, Vogel calls for an increased focus on the social and political context in which weapons are developed and used.

Vogel, who has a Ph.D. in biological chemistry from Princeton University, draws on theoretical perspectives from the field of science and technology studies to examine a series of historical and contemporary case studies involving state and non-state actors: Soviet anthrax weapons development, the Iraqi mobile bioweapons labs and two synthetic genomic experiments.

"These case studies reveal important, taken-for-granted assumptions and blind spots in how knowledge about biological weapons has been produced. These shortcomings have led to failures in how U.S. bioweapons assessments have been conducted, interpreted and used for national security policymaking," said Vogel, who also holds a joint appointment in Cornell's Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies.

Involving close engagement with scientific practice, policymaking and the scholarship of science and technology studies, the book proposes a new way of analyzing bioweapons-related technologies and threats from broader weapons of mass destruction using a synthesis of technical and social science methodologies. She concludes with recommendations for analysts and policymakers to integrate socio-political analysis with technical analyses, thereby making U.S. bioweapon assessments more accurate.

Said Vogel, "Reforming bioweapons assessments is a tall order, but one that must be filled if we want more accurate assessments of emerging bioweapons threats to inform policymaking."

 

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